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Abstract
Background: In the past decade there has been increasing visibility of malaria control efforts at the national and international
levels. The factors that have enhanced this scenario are the availability of proven interventions such as artemisinin-based
combination therapy, the wide scale use of insecticide-treated nets (ITNs) and a renewed emphasis in indoor residual house-
spraying. Concurrently, there has been a window of opportunity of financial commitments from organizations such as the Global
Fund for HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), the President's Malaria Initiative and the World Bank Booster
programme.
Methods:  The case study uses the health policy analysis framework to analyse the implementation of a public-private
partnership approach embarked upon by the government of Tanzania in malaria control – 'The Tanzania National Voucher
Scheme'- and in this synthesis, emphasis is on the challenges faced by the scheme during the pre-implementation (2001 – 2004)
and implementation phases (2004 – 2005). Qualitative research tools used include: document review, interview with key
informants, stakeholder's analysis, force-field analysis, time line of events, policy characteristic analysis and focus group
discussions. The study is also complemented by a cross-sectional survey, which was conducted at the Rufiji Health Demographic
Surveillance Site, where a cohort of women of child-bearing age were followed up regarding access and use of ITNs.
Results:  The major challenges observed include: the re-introduction of taxes on mosquito nets and related products,
procurement and tendering procedures in the implementation of the GFATM, and organizational arrangements and free delivery
of mosquito nets through a Presidential initiative.
Conclusion: The lessons gleaned from this synthesis include: (a) the consistency of the stakeholders with a common vision,
was an important strength in overcoming obstacles, (b) senior politicians often steered the policy agenda when the policy in
question was a 'crisis event', the stakes and the visibility were high, (c) national stakeholders in policy making have an advantage
in strengthening alliances with international organizations, where the latter can become extremely influential in solving
bottlenecks as the need arises, and (d) conflict can be turned into an opportunity, for example the Presidential initiative has
inadvertently provided Tanzania with important lessons in the organization of 'catch-up' campaigns.
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Background
Malaria remains one of the major tropical challenges in
the world today. Based on World Health Reports 1999–
2004, the number of malaria deaths globally has been
estimated at 1.1–1.3 million [1]. The most recent World
Health report estimates that malaria incidence rates are
350–500 million per annum [2]. In the past three dec-
ades, malaria has, however, encroached upon areas where
it had formerly been eradicated or had successfully been
controlled, offsetting the gains attained in the latter half of
the past century [3]. The disease is endemic in 107 coun-
tries with some 3.2 billion lives at risk of transmission.
About 60% of the cases of malaria worldwide, 75% of glo-
bal falciparum malaria cases and more than 80% of
malaria deaths occur in Africa South of the Sahara. Plasmo-
dium falciparum causes the vast majority of infections in
this region and about 18% of deaths in children under
five years of age [2].
Studies focusing on under-five children in African popula-
tions conclude that 600,000 children contract cerebral
malaria yearly, with a case fatality rate of 20%. Severe
malaria due to anaemia occurs in 1.5 – 6.0 million African
children, with a case fatality rate of 15% [4]. Malaria is
also a major threat to pregnant women and adversely
affects foetal growth and newborn survival through low
birth weight.
The socio-economic impact of malaria is extremely high
in endemic countries. It has been observed that over the
past 25 years the economic growth in malarial countries
has been hampered [5]. It incapacitates the workforce,
leading to decreased economic productivity and output in
various sectors of the economy [6].
In the past decade, proven interventions, such as artemisi-
nin-based combination therapy (ACT), the wide-scale use
of insecticide-treated nets (ITNs) and a renewed emphasis
in indoor residual house-spraying (IRS), are available for
combating the disease. The challenge is to ensure that
these relatively inexpensive interventions reach a major
proportion of the population through universal coverage.
A number of global initiatives have been developed lead-
ing to increased awareness of malaria such as the Roll
Back Malaria (RBM) initiative spearheaded by the World
Health Organization's Director General in 1998, followed
up by the Abuja Declaration on Roll Back Malaria by Afri-
can Heads of State [7], and most recently a statement
made by the World Health Assembly [8]. In this state-
ment, member states are urged to establish policies and
operational plans to ensure that at least 80% of those at
risk of or suffering from malaria benefit from major pre-
ventive and curative interventions in accordance with
WHO technical recommendations, by 2010 so as to
ensure a reduction in the burden of malaria of at least
50% by 2010 and by 75% by 2015.
The Abuja targets were revisited in 2006 where all the
indicators were raised from 60% to 80% on the basis of
current opportunities and increasing visibility of financial
support from the global community such as the Global
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM),
President's Malaria Initiative (PMI), World Bank Booster
funding and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation [9].
During the last 15 years, a large body of evidence has been
compiled on the key technical and managerial aspects of
ITNs as well as on their efficacy and effectiveness. A sys-
tematic review of 22 randomized controlled trials showed
a consistently high impact of ITNs [10,11] preventing
malaria episodes. Current debates around ITNs, interna-
tionally and nationally where malaria is endemic, is the
appropriate delivery mechanisms for wide-scale use of
ITNs [12-15]. The advantages and challenges of the vari-
ous delivery mechanisms have been discussed.
Tanzania has been on the forefront in the promotion of
the use of ITNs from research projects in the 1980s and
1990s [16-18] and validation in larger field trials in early
2000 [19,20] to a nation-wide programme through a dis-
count voucher scheme delivered through a public-private
partnership approach [21,22]. The ITN activities in Tanza-
nia were closely linked to international developments
including: randomized controlled trials [23-25], techno-
logical developments in the home treatment kits [26],
rationalization of taxes and tariffs and expansion, and
investment in Long-Lasting Insecticide-treated Nets
(LLIN).
Through the nationwide discount voucher scheme, preg-
nant women access the vouchers at the Antenatal clinics in
public health facilities. The voucher is redeemed for a
mosquito net of her choice at a shop in the catchment area
of the health facility by adding a variable top-up, ranging
between 0.75 – 1.25 USD depending on the size of the
mosquito net purchased [21,22].
Since April 2008, the pregnant woman voucher has been
complemented with an infant voucher scheme, which
uses the same delivery mechanism as the pregnant
woman voucher through the Antenatal Clinics. It is also a
country-wide initiative. Until mid-year 2008, the two
schemes combined totaled a redemption of 3.5 million
nets as a share of the mosquito nets available in the coun-
try through these groups [27].
A recent study carried out in a rural setting in Tanzania
showed that a combination of interventions, such as
vouchers for the vulnerable groups, free mosquito netsMalaria Journal 2009, 8:201 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/8/1/201
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and full-cost nets in the local market have proved to raise
the coverage of mosquito nets in different segments of the
population substantially thus complementing each other
[28]. A lot of research on ITNs has concentrated on the
outcomes and impact of the intervention on malaria and
most recently investigations have been done on various
delivery mechanisms to ensure the tool is available to the
target groups as alluded to above. However, there is very
little covered in the research in terms of health policy
analysis in malaria [29] and Njau et al, in press). However
health policy analysis has been used in HIV/AIDS and has
also been used to describe health sector reforms in the
country [30-33].
Community health financing (CHF) was introduced in
Tanzania through the health sector reforms since 1995
[31,34], with an overarching aim of resource generation
and equity. Using the health policy analysis framework,
the authors point to the top-down approach in the devel-
opment of the community health financing policy, where
there was no interaction of the central Ministry of Health
(MoH) with the sub-national levels in the conceptualiza-
tion of the CHF[30,31]. Furthermore managerial weak-
nesses were also observed. These included lack of
supervision and accountability by the district managers.
In Mwanza, Tanzania, the health policy analytical frame-
work was used to describe extensively how HIV/AIDS
research findings were successfully been translated to pol-
icy [32]. The trial demonstrated the effectiveness of
improved treatment services for Sexually Transmitted
Infections in preventing HIV infections. The factors that
influenced the policy impact of the research results
included: 1) research data packaged in a simple manner
digestible by politicians, 2) researchers and policy makers
formed strategic alliances for the policy shift, and 3) the
policy environment was conducive.
Methodological approach
The present research uses the health policy analysis frame-
work [35] to analyse the implementation of a unique
model embarked upon by the government of Tanzania –
'The Tanzania National Voucher Scheme (TNVS)' – in the
control of malaria. The present study concentrates on the
challenges faced by the scheme in the public-private part-
nership (PPP) approach during the key pre-implementa-
tion phase (2001 – 2004) and implementation phases
(2004 – 2006). The process of decision-making and how
the discount voucher scheme was conceptualized is
described elsewhere (Njau et al, in press). A case study
approach is used to describe in-depth the challenges that
the stakeholders' faced in the two phases mentioned in
this synthesis and how they attempted to overcome them
[24]. The analysis unpacks the different challenges
encountered at the international level, including issues
confronted in signing the GFATM grant proposal, which
supported the implementation of the scheme, and, at the
national level, the marketing challenges in promoting the
ITNs. Lastly, observations were made at the community
level on the challenges encountered by the Council
Health Management Teams (CHMTs) and health care pro-
viders in the context of a cross-sectional survey conducted
at the Rufiji Demographic Surveillance Site (DSS)
(Figure 1).
Data collection tools
Qualitative and quantitative methods were used in the
study to highlight the challenges experienced at the differ-
ent levels of the health care delivery system in the imple-
mentation of the country-wide subsidy scheme.
Qualitative methods
The qualitative methods included: key informant inter-
views from the national and district levels, policy charac-
teristic analysis, stakeholders' analysis and focus group
discussions.
Key informant interviews
The interviews were carried out through 2005 and 2006.
A balanced selection of key informants were interviewed
from the MoH, the National Malaria Control Programme
(NMCP), the CHMT in Rufiji district, Reproductive and
Child Health (RCH) coordinators in randomly selected
health facilities in Rufiji, stakeholders sub-contracted by
the MOH to implement the TNVS and stakeholders
involved in malaria control through technical support to
the MOH. Other groups interviewed included influential
people from the community and the private sector. The
private-for-profit sector included some of the Tanzania
Net Manufacturing companies, Price Waterhouse Coop-
ers, wholesalers and retailers while the private-not-for-
profit included Population Services International (PSI)
and the Christian Social Services Commission (CSSC).
The synthesis identified 14 key informants from the onset
to be interviewed, however, 10 more were added through
a snowball effect, as key people mentioned through the
first interviews were sought and added to the list [36].
The review involved going through relevant documents
related to the socio-economic and political environment
of the country, such as the National strategic plans, the
health reform polices and specifically the national malaria
control plans. Published data on malaria control and pub-
lic health policy were extensively reviewed, while second-
ary data included the NMCP annual reports, TNVS
reports, CHMT reports and excerpts from the Tanzania
National Coordinating Mechanism. The document review
enabled the analyst to gather a historical perspective of the
events leading to the development and implementation
of a PPP initiative for scaling up ITNs (Njau et al in press).Malaria Journal 2009, 8:201 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/8/1/201
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Sampled health facilities and wards in the Rufiji Demographic Surveillance Site Figure 1
Sampled health facilities and wards in the Rufiji Demographic Surveillance Site.Malaria Journal 2009, 8:201 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/8/1/201
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The time-line of events, which was derived from the doc-
ument review, identifies the key steps in the implementa-
tion of the scaling-up of ITNs country-wide in a
chronological manner (Tables 1 and 2).
Stakeholders' analysis
Stakeholders' analysis was also used in the research and
enabled the reviewer to understand the actors' behaviour,
interests, intentions and interactions. It further allowed
the assessment of the actors influence and resources that
they brought to bear on decision making in the develop-
ment and the implementation of a PPP initiative in the
wide-scale use of ITNs [36]. The information for each
group/actor was arrayed according to the group interests,
the level of resources the group or actor possessed and the
groups' position on the PPP initiative. The resources that
were identified in the stakeholders analysis were drawn
from the preliminary policy characteristic analysis
[37,38]. These included (a) technical resources, described
here as the inherent technical expertise that the stake-
holder has that would be critical to the implementation of
the policy or by virtue of the stakeholders position in rela-
tion to the implementation of the policy (for example, the
presence of the Tanzania Net Manufacturers in the coun-
try providing a market for mosquito nets); (b) political
resources, expounded here as the influence that the stake-
Table 1: Time line of events in the implementation of an insecticide treated nets subsidy scheme under a Public – Private -Partnership 
for malaria control in Tanzania
Year Key National Factors Key Global Factors
1984 – 1994 Research in Tanzania on insecticide treated nets in experimental 
huts and small-scale field trials
1994 Kunduchi Meeting, Dar-es- Salaam on 'Net Gain'* – first 
international/broad discussion on social marketing of ITNs
1996 British Council Meeting, Dar-es-Salaam Tanzania Essential Health 
Intervention Project (TEHIP) invites stakeholders to discuss on 
'How to measure mortality impact in populations,' prior to the 
launch of the Demographic Surveillance System in Rufiji. The 
KINET project was conceptualised here
1994 – 1996 Randomized controlled trials on the impact of ITNs on overall 
childhood mortality
1996 DRC – Development of home-treatment kit for the treatment of 
mosquito nets
1997 International Advisor from the Tanzania Essential Health Project 
and Director of Promotional Services International approach A to 
Z Textile Mills on the issue of increasing production on mosquito 
nets (This was during the International Public Health Association 
meeting in Arusha).
First International Conference on Bed-nets and other treated 
materials for the prevention of malaria**, Washington, USA
The Tanzania Essential Health Intervention Project (TEHIP) is 
launched in Rufiji and Morogoro Rural
1998 Meeting at White Sands Hotel, Dar-es-Salaam to discuss Marketing 
Challenges in the Promotion of ITNs***. This was a multisectoral 
meeting involving both the public and private and the NGO sector. 
Major agenda was the rationalization of taxes and tariffs on ITNs in 
Tanzania
The Roll Back Malaria Partnership is created
1998 – 2001 First and second phase of social marketing of Insecticide treated 
nets – Population Services International
1999 Three textile manufacturing companies scale up production of 
mosquito nets [A to Z Textile Mills and Sunflag Textile industries 
in Arusha and Tanzania Textile Manufacturing Limited (TMTL) in 
Dar-es-Salaam]
Second International conference on Insecticide treated Nets 
for the prevention of malaria, Dar-es-Salaam****
Ad hoc meeting of a decides to go to national scale
Multilateral Initiative for Malaria (MIM) – Dar-es-Salaam
1999/2000 Rationalization of Taxes and tariffs on mosquito nets. Legislation is 
passed mosquito nets are zero rated VAT and import duty. 
Mosquito nets are classified under the essential drug list. Polyester 
yarn is still levied 20% VAT but is refundable to the manufacturer 
on production of relevant documents
2000/2001 Insecticides for treating mosquito nets are zero rated VAT and 
import duty, polyester yarn is also zero rated VAT and import 
duty
* First International conference on bednets and other treated materials for the prevention of malaria, USAID Report, 1997
*** NMCP/IDRC/PATH Marketing challenges for the public and private sector, white Sands Hotel, Dar-es-Salaam, 1998
**** Insecticide treated nets in the 21st Century, Report on the Second International conference on ITNs, Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, 1999Malaria Journal 2009, 8:201 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/8/1/201
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Table 2: Time line of events in the implementation of an insecticide-treated nets subsidy scheme under a public-private partnership for 
malaria control in Tanzania (period from 2000 to 2006)
Year Key National Factors Key Global Factors
2000 Finalization of large scale social marketing programme on ITNs in South-
East Tanzania (Abdullah et al 2000; Schellenberg et al 2001)
Meeting with stakeholders on 'Going to Scale with Insecticide Treated 
Nets' in Tanzaniał
A strategic plan on scaling up of ITNs in Tanzania is developedłł
Multisectoral task force is formed to spearhead the implementation of 
ITNs in the country
Speech by the His Excellency the President of the United Republic of 
Tanzania; President William Mkapa at a fund raising dinner for the 
comprehensive control of malaria in Zanzibar
2001 Terms of reference for ITN Steering Committee and Consultative group 
developed
Task force is therefore converted to an 'ITN Steering Committee' chaired 
by the Chief Medical Officer of the MOH
2002–2003 Third phase of social marketing of Insecticide treated nets (SMARTNET) – 
Population Services International
2002 An implementation plan for scaling up of ITNs in Tanzania is developed GFATM awards Tanzania 19.8 million USD for the 
NATNETs project for a period of 3 years
All locally produced mosquito nets are bundled with an insecticide re-
treatment kit
Submission of a proposal on the National Insecticide Treated Nets 
implementation (NATNETs) plan support to the GFATM Round 1
Reintroduction of VAT on raw materials for the production of mosquito 
nets by the MOF
2003 ITN team leader recruited at the beginning of year and Administrator and 
Communication Officer recruited at the end of the year. Financial support 
towards the technical staff for the ITN cell made available through SDC. 
Proposal prepared by STIłłł and NMCP
International community advocate for free nets
Steering Committee reconstituted, reflecting a much more narrower 
committee
Development Cooperation Ireland contribute financially towards the 
NATNETs programme
Sensitization of members of Parliament on the disease burden of malaria, 
its impact on the economy and strategies for its prevention with emphasis 
on the use of ITNs
2004 Implementation of the NATNETs project delays until October 2004 – 
launch by Honourable Vice President
Districts officially informed to examine ways in which existing ITN activities 
(revolving fund, sale of nets by health facilities and free distribution of ITNs) 
can be phased out once the TNVS is introduced in respective districts
Price WaterHouse Coopers is appointed as the Local Fund Agent for the 
NATNET project
TNVS Advocacy Meeting to Regions in the First Roll out Phase and other 
stakeholders, Morogoro
Launching of LLIN produced by A to Z by the Honourable President of the 
United Republic, Benjamin Mkapa
2004 – 2005 An additional net manufacturing company becomes operational established 
in Northern Tanzania; Motex Textiles Ltd
2005 SDC supports second phase of the ITN cell up to 2008. Proposal prepared 
by STI and NMCP
World Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland – 
Honurable former Head of State – Benjamin Mkapa 
receives a donation towards malaria control in 
Tanzania
Monitoring and Evaluation of the TNVS by IHRDC and LSHTM – 2005 and 
2006
The United Republic of Tanzania invests in scale-up of Long Lasting 
Insecticide Treated Nets in the A to Z Textile Manufacturing company in 
Arusha through building a road to the new manufacturing site and 
provision of water
ł PricewatersHouseCoopers and Population Service International, Going to scale with insecticide treated nets, Dar-es-Salaam, March 2000
łł United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Health, National Malaria Control Programme, Taking insecticide treated nets to national scale in 
Tanzania, November, 2000Malaria Journal 2009, 8:201 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/8/1/201
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holder has on the ITN subsidy scheme through direct or
indirect interaction with government officials; and (c)
financial resources, the stakeholders influence over the
economic situation. For example, PSI conducting social
marketing of ITNs in the remotest parts of the country, or
the UK Department for International Development avail-
ing financial support towards social marketing initiatives.
The stakeholders' analysis enabled the synthesis to look
retrospectively at the key actors and groups of actors and
their influence, or lack of it, in the development and the
implementation of a PPP in scaling-up ITNs country-
wide. The outcome enabled the analyst to draw recom-
mendations for future health policies in relation to opti-
mizing participation under conditions of limited
resources [39].
Force-field analysis
Force-field analysis and micro-political mapping were
used in support of the stakeholders' analysis, where the
former clarified the array of support on the discount
voucher scheme by different stakeholders and micro-
political mapping showed the sources of actors influence
over the implementation of the ITN subsidy scheme in the
decision making phase, the pre-implementation and
implementation phases [40].
Focus group discussions
Two focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted
where purposive sampling was used to select individuals
from two separate villages from Ikwiriri and Kibiti divi-
sions under the Rufiji DSS. Each group, consisting of 8 –
12 individuals, included women of child-bearing age and
some women in these groups were pregnant and others
had infants at the time of the survey. Older women in the
society of different socio-economic status were also
included [41]. Each FGD took between 45 – 50 minutes.
Guiding questions were prepared with the major aim of
finding out from the women what the major health prob-
lems in the village were, how they addressed them and
whether they were acquainted to the discount voucher
scheme.
Qualitative data analysis
Triangulation
Triangulation of the information accrued from the inter-
views was done through published and grey literature.
Policy characteristic analysis
A policy characteristic analysis was used to provide a sys-
tematic understanding of what the policy change was
designed to do, the context in which the policy was imple-
mented, the consequences of the change and the reactions
of the public and/or the bureaucracy [37].
Grounded theory
A number of informants came-up with quite similar issues
and perspectives on key subjects related to the issue. One
or two quotes representing the thoughts are quoted to
reflect the thoughts of the key actors; however they are
kept anonymous. Controversial issues and perceptions of
some key actors were also quoted to enlighten the reader
on the hurdles that the implementers faced and how they
were able to overcome them. In most instances the quota-
tions are validated through the literature review which
was conducted. This approach is described as the
grounded theory [42,43].
Quantitative analysis
A retrospective cohort of women of child bearing age from
Ikwiriri and Kibiti divisions of the Rufiji district in the
Coast Region – the Rufiji DSS database was followed-up
twice in the survey coinciding with the normal DSS
updates (Figure 1). The first follow-up was during the Feb-
ruary 2005 – May 2005 cycle, immediately after the dis-
count voucher was launched in the district. The second
follow-up was in the June 2005 – September 2005 cycle,
when the discount voucher scheme had been operational
for eight months. The Rufiji DSS involves continuous sur-
veillance of households and members within households
in cycles or intervals of four months each. The informa-
tion collected in these cycles includes demographic,
household, socioeconomic and environmental character-
istics of the population [44].
The sample size estimation for the number of households
with the probability of having pregnant women was cal-
culated using the estimates of the proportion of pregnant
women and women of child bearing age in the RDSS cen-
sus of 2003. The anticipated proportion of pregnant
women with a mosquito net through the TNVS was esti-
mated at 50%. With a precision of 5% and an average
household of 4.7, a total of 1048 households were sam-
pled. Systematic random sampling was used, where nine
villages were selected from Kibiti, Mchukwi and Bungu
wards of Kibiti division, and three villages from the Ikwir-
iri, Mgomba and Umwe wards (Figure 1).
A semi-structured questionnaire was used to collect infor-
mation on ITN possession and use. This was triangulated
with subsequent surveys carried out by the monitoring
and evaluation contractors during the implementation of
the TNVS [45]. The questions included knowledge of
TNVS, access to ITNs, barriers to access and redemption
mechanisms. The relationship between socio-economic
status and health has been an area of increasing interest in
recent years [46,47]. A number of studies have used the
socio-economic status to predict variance against mortal-
ity of children under five (infant and <5 mortality) and
health interventions such as household possession ofMalaria Journal 2009, 8:201 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/8/1/201
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mosquito nets [44,48,49]. Each member of the cohort of
women of child-bearing age was matched with the respec-
tive socio-economic household indicator index derived
from the Rufiji DSS in 2000 for mosquito net possession.
The socio-economic data was collected during the Octo-
ber 2000 – January 2001 Rufiji DSS cycle. This included
asset ownership, housing conditions, source of energy for
cooking, type of water and sanitation [44]. Principle Com-
ponent Analysis, using Stata 7.0 (Stata Corporation), was
applied to the socio-economic data to obtain a proxy
index for household socio-economic status [44,50]. The
cohort was divided into socio-economic quintiles for
analyses [44].
Data management for the quantitative analysis
Data was entered into Excel® and processed in Stata Ver-
sion 9.0®. Data was entered twice and cleaned by data
managers at the Rufiji DSS. The analysis was done for
computing frequencies, Chi square tests and calculating
Confidence intervals for examining the real differences in
net use amongst the cohort of women of child-bearing age
followed up and the difference in net acquisition of the
different social economic groups.
Challenges in the implementation of the country wide 
subsidy scheme through a PPP approach
The first part of this synthesis analysed the period of
'building momentum' toward a country-wide scale-up of
a discount voucher scheme. The main conclusion was that
the PPP approach to the initiative was made through
incremental approaches both at the national and interna-
tional levels and the process was dynamic and complex
and far from linear. Secondly, the analysis also observed
that the policy implementation has stretched over several
years and is still evolving.
Tanzania is a fairly stable country politically with a unitary
system of government embedded in its socialist history
[51]. Since 1995, the government has turned to a market-
based economy and has in the recent past introduced a
series of comprehensive frameworks to address the issues
surrounding poverty, with Vision 2025 as the overarching
development framework [51]. In this relatively stable con-
text and a maturing open market, the voucher scheme for
the control of malaria was not implemented without chal-
lenges and 'hiccups.'
Coational shifts in support or opposition of the scheme
was observed in the implementation phase as the major
stakeholders 'increased' or 'decreased' their interest in the
subsidy programme. The stakeholders' analysis vividly
brought forward the attributes that the individual actors
had in influencing the policy depending on the strength
or the power that they possessed. Figures 2, 3 and 4 high-
light the actors' position in the process of decision-mak-
ing, key steps towards implementation and the
implementation phase, respectively. Figures 5, 6 and 7
stipulate the sources of actors influence over the imple-
mentation of the subsidy scheme in all three phases.
Marketing challenges in promoting ITNs – White Sands 
meeting 1998
As the agenda had been set, with a firm foundation for the
PPP approach in scaling up ITNs, a number of challenges
were to be addressed in the pre-implementation stage.
One of the milestones in the momentum that was being
created in providing a conducive environment for the up-
scaling of ITNs was a meeting held at the White Sands
Hotel in 1998 [52]. A serious barrier to ITN promotion
identified at this meeting was taxation. The meeting out-
lined plans of action for follow-up and assigned various
tasks to the different stakeholders. Some of the tasks
included outlining a strategy to petition against the intro-
duction of Value Added Tax (VAT) on mosquito nets and
insecticides, lobbying members of parliament and influ-
ential individuals. Wide dissemination of the meeting rec-
ommendations to key stakeholders such as the World
Bank (both nationally and internationally), WHO, the
World Trade Organization and the media. Finally, in the
MOF Bill of 1999/2000, the tireless efforts of all stake-
holders proved fruitful when mosquito nets were zero
rated for import duty and VAT, and classified under the
essential drug list of the MoH. The 20% VAT levied on
100% polyester yarn was refundable to the manufacturing
companies as rebate on production of relevant docu-
ments, which had been audited and certified by the Tan-
zania Revenue Authority. In this manner, they established
the volume of imported yarn, which was actually used to
produce a certain number of mosquito nets (as polyester
yarn could also be used to make other fabrics) [53].
A revisit of the rationalization of taxes and tariffs on ITNs
An issue already well dealt with during the decision mak-
ing stage, appeared once again in the pre-implementation
phase (phase II): the issue of taxes and tariffs related to
ITNs, with the re-introduction of VAT by the Ministry of
Finance (MoF) in May 2002 on raw materials for produc-
tion of mosquito nets. This was discussed at length at the
steering committee of the National ITN Strategy (NAT-
NET) in 2003. One of the members of the committee
remarked as follows;
"Lobbying is needed to re-instate zero rating on VAT as well as
zero rating customs duty. There is a risk if this is not achieved
in this budget (as the fiscal year for the Government begins
June/July – hence any amendment had to be done before that)
there will never be a revision. The Minister of Health has been
made aware of this issue and information has been sent to the
Ministry of Finance. The current tax policy favours imported
nets as finished products imported are not subject to VAT. It
was noted however that imported nets were not bundled and
due to the uneven playing field of the imported nets versusMalaria Journal 2009, 8:201 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/8/1/201
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locally produced nets there was a general supply shortfall of
mosquito nets in the country (Steering committee member, 7th
March 2003)."
At the time of this synthesis the members of the NATNET
steering committee were the Chief Medical Officer (the
chairperson), the Programme Manager of the NMCP (the
secretariat), the ITN Cell Team Leader, the UK Depart-
ment for International Development, the Swiss Develop-
ment Corporation, the President's Malaria Initiative, the
Irish AID, WHO, UNICEF and PSI.
A tax reform task force is set-up
The NATNETs steering committee set-up a 'Tax reform
task force,' with the objective of (a) providing an assess-
ment of the changes at that particular time in the VAT leg-
islation on the importation and local manufacture of
mosquito nets, and (b) to make recommendations as to
how to minimize the effect of the changes such that the
The process of decision-making – Actors position in the process of adopting a public-private-partnership approach to an ITN  subsidy scheme- 1998 – 2001 Figure 2
The process of decision-making – Actors position in the process of adopting a public-private-partnership 
approach to an ITN subsidy scheme- 1998 – 2001. Notes: Figures 2, 3 and 4 indicate the degree of support or opposi-
tion in relation to the process of adopting a public-private-partnership approach to an ITN subsidy scheme in different imple-
mentation phases; Phase I – 1998 – 2001; Phase II – 2001 – 2004 and phase III – 2004–2006. It also shows how the actors 
position shift over time (Varvasvsky and Brugha, 2000). The source of information includes a stakeholder's analysis and docu-
mentary data.
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tax burden was removed from the local manufacturer of
mosquito nets.
On completion of its assignment, the task force observed
that the amendments to the new taxes effectively restored
the position of the old VAT Act of July 1998, where the
mosquito nets produced locally and all the raw materials
and overheads were VAT exempt. They were not able to
claim back any VAT to the extent that they relate to domes-
tic sales. In this case they would have to absorb this irre-
coverable VAT by accepting reduced margins or passing it
over to the consumer, through an increase in their selling
price with the risk of reducing sales. However, importers
of nets were zero rated for VAT at the point of entry. Thus,
an uneven playing field between the locally-produced
nets and the imported nets was created. The task force
looked at the rationale behind the 2002 changes and sum-
marized their recommendations as follows: the pressure
for change in relief afforded in any country could be
because of special interest groups who felt that the special
relieves are disadvantaged to them or does not cater for
their particular needs. Secondly, there may be pressure
from within the government administration to change the
reliefs available by increasing or decreasing them to
remove inequalities of treatment, to remove ambiguities,
to raise revenue or to give relief for social reasons[54].
The task force visited two of the three net manufacturing
companies in the country at the time. The companies
stated there would be an increase of 10 to 20% in mos-
quito net price should the government re-introduce VAT.
The course of action suggested by the task force was that,
a written submission had to be prepared by the MoH,
from the senior health officials to the MoF, making a case
for the changes required and proposals for the re-wording
of the schedule. Subsequent to this submission, meetings
were to be held between senior MOH officials and the
Commissioner of Finance. The task force advised the
Key steps towards implementation – Actors position in the steps towards implementation of a public – private – partnership  approach to an ITN subsidy scheme – 2001 – 2004 Figure 3
Key steps towards implementation – Actors position in the steps towards implementation of a public – private 
– partnership approach to an ITN subsidy scheme – 2001 – 2004. 
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MoH to request for the following in their submission to
the MoF [54]: (a) to leave mosquito nets as VAT exempt,
which implies no VAT at point of sale to consumer but
VAT charged and not recoverable on all manufacturing
inputs; (b) to levy a customs duty of 10% on ready-made
mosquito nets. Therefore, leveling the playing field
between imported nets and domestic mosquito nets.
Discourse between technical advisor and the TNVS steering 
committee
The NATNET steering committee did not agree with the
recommendations of the task force and, therefore, wrote a
memo to the Permanent Secretary of MoH [55], through
the UK Department for International Development (as a
member of the steering committee), requesting the resto-
ration of zero rating on the sale of nets by domestic man-
ufacturers and the removal of customs duty on material
imported for the manufacture of mosquito nets. The
memorandum also stressed that what the appointed task
force had recommended on the tax issue was contrary to
the international commendation made to Tanzania in
early 2000 on the progressive rationalization of taxes and
tariffs on mosquito nets and inputs in the production of
mosquito nets and was a standing example to other
malaria endemic countries.
To re-enforce the steering committees plea, the net manu-
facturers had written a memorandum to the Commis-
sioner of VAT, dated 2nd August 2002, requesting the
Tanzania Revenue Authority to re-visit the new taxes
Implementation phase – Actors position in the implementation of a public – private – partnership approach to an ITN subsidy  scheme – 2004 – 2005 Figure 4
Implementation phase – Actors position in the implementation of a public – private – partnership approach to 
an ITN subsidy scheme – 2004 – 2005. 
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imposed on domestic mosquito nets. The memorandum
was copied to the Permanent Secretaries of the MoH, the
MoF and the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Pro-
gramme Manager of the NMCP, WHO, the Tanzania
Essential Health Intervention Project (TEHIP) and PSI.
Government medical stores department affected by tax reforms
Furthermore, the Medical Stores Department (MSD),
which was the sole government semi-autonomous organ-
ization responsible for ordering pharmaceuticals, medical
equipment and supplies on behalf of the government,
found that the new tax amendment also affected them.
They stated in their memorandum [56] which they
addressed to the Permanent Secretary, MoH, "......as a
result 10% import duty is levied on all pharmaceuticals, includ-
ing vaccines, TB and Leprosy drugs procured by her depart-
ments, and those given as donations. This has a very negative
impact over our budget and ultimately to the end user, which is
the Government health facilities. MSD has applied for a waiver
of such taxes through the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of
The process of decision making – The source of actors influence over the implementation of an ITN subsidy scheme – 1998 –  2001 Figure 5
The process of decision making – The source of actors influence over the implementation of an ITN subsidy 
scheme – 1998 – 2001. Source of influence figures adapted from; Gilson L., Doherrty J., Lake S., Mcintyre D., Mwikisa C and 
Thomas S.2003. The SAZA study: implementing health financing reform in South Africa and Zambia. Hlth Policy and Planning. 
18 (1): 31–46. Political resource – described here as the influence that the stakeholder has on the ITN subsidy scheme through 
direct or indirect interaction with government officials. Government here is denoted as 'public institutions in which collective 
decisions are made into laws that affect the whole society; parliament, the executive, the bureaucracy, ministries or depart-
ments of state (Walt, 1994)'. Technical resource – described here as the inherent technical expertise that the stakeholder has 
that would be critical to the implementation of the policy or by virtue of the stakeholders position in relation to the implemen-
tation of the policy. For example the presence of the Tanzania Net Manufacturers in the country providing a market for mos-
quito nets. Financial resource – the stakeholders influence over the economic situation. For example, Promotional Service 
International conducting social marketing of ITNs in the remotest parts of the country, or DFID availing financial support 
towards social marketing initiatives. Number of ticks indicates relative level of influence derived from source: 3 ticks = high 
influence; no tick = no influence. For example the influence of the Chief Medical Officer derived from technical source was due 
to his authoritative position as the lead advisor in health within the Ministry of Health and as a Chairperson of the steering 
committee of the Tanzania National Voucher Scheme. While the influence of the Tanzania Net Manufacturers derived from 
technical source is their expertise in the local production of mosquito nets, hence the availability of the public health commod-
ity within the country locally. Values/behaviours refers to the differing behaviours of the actors (e.g. rooted in clear principles 
or values, tactical and strategic, expressing commitment). For example the CSSC was highly committed to PPPs as a general 
health policy and was spearheading it so that it could be institutionalized; however it perceived that the ITN subsidy scheme 
had not adequately involved Faith Based Organizations at the grass root level
Technical Financial
CMO/DPS high √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√
Programme 
Manager - 
NMCP
high √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√
Promotional 
Service 
International
high √√ √√ √√ √√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√
Tanzania Net 
Manufacturers Middle/high √√ √√ √√ √√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√
WHO High √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√
UNICEF Middle √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √√ √ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√
Technical 
Advisor - TEHIP
Middle/high √√ √√ √√ √√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√
DFID Middle/high √ √ √ √√ √ √√ √√ √√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√
PATH Canada Middle/high √√ √√ √√ √√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√
IHRDC Middle √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√
TPRI Low
CSSC Middle √ √ √ √√ √ √ √√√ √√√ √√√ √ √ √ √√ √ √√ √√ √√
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ł
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Key steps towards implementation – The source of actors influence over the implementation of an ITN subsidy scheme – 2001  – 2004 Figure 6
Key steps towards implementation – The source of actors influence over the implementation of an ITN sub-
sidy scheme – 2001 – 2004. Source of influence figures adapted from; Gilson L., Doherrty J., Lake S., Mcintyre D., Mwikisa C 
and Thomas S.2003. The SAZA study: implementing health financing reform in South Africa and Zambia. Hlth Policy and Plan-
ning. 18 (1): 31–46. Political resource – described here as the influence that the stakeholder has on the ITN subsidy scheme 
through direct or indirect interaction with government officials. Government here is denoted as 'public institutions in which 
collective decisions are made into laws that affect the whole society; parliament, the executive, the bureaucracy, ministries or 
departments of state (Walt, 1994)'. Technical resource – described here as the inherent technical expertise that the stake-
holder has that would be critical to the implementation of the policy or by virtue of the stakeholders position in relation to the 
implementation of the policy. For example the presence of the Tanzania Net Manufacturers in the country providing a market 
for mosquito nets. Financial resource – the stakeholders influence over the economic situation. For example, Promotional 
Service International conducting social marketing of ITNs in the remotest parts of the country, or DFID availing financial sup-
port towards social marketing initiatives. Number of ticks indicates relative level of influence derived from source: 3 ticks = 
high influence; no tick = no influence. For example the influence of the Chief Medical Officer derived from technical source was 
due to his authoritative position as the lead advisor in health within the Ministry of Health and as a Chairperson of the steering 
committee of the Tanzania National Voucher Scheme. While the influence of the Tanzania Net Manufacturers derived from 
technical source is their expertise in the local production of mosquito nets, hence the availability of the public health commod-
ity within the country locally. Values/behaviours refers to the differing behaviours of the actors (e.g. rooted in clear principles 
or values, tactical and strategic, expressing commitment). For example the CSSC was highly committed to PPPs as a general 
health policy and was spearheading it so that it could be institutionalized; however it perceived that the ITN subsidy scheme 
had not adequately involved Faith Based Organizations at the grass root level
Technical Financial
CMO/DPS high √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√
Programme 
Manager - 
NMCP
high √√ √√ √√ √√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√
Team Leader high √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√
MEDA Middle/high √√ √√ √√ √√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√
CARE Middle/high √√ √√ √√ √√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√
WVT
Tanzania Net 
Manufacturers Middle/high √√ √√ √√ √√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√
Promotional 
Service 
International
high √√ √√ √√ √√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√
TANAAM Middle/high √ √ √ √√ √ √√ √√ √√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√
GFATM - 
Technical 
Review panel
Middle/high √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √ √ √ √√ √ √√ √√ √√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√
GFATM - PWC Middle/high √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √√ √ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√
WHO Middle/high √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√
UNICEF Middle √ √ √ √√ √ √√ √√ √√ √ √ √ √√ √ √√ √√ √√ √ √ √ √
Technical 
Advisor - TEHIP
Middle/high √√ √√ √√ √√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√
DFID, SDC, DCI, 
RNE high √√ √√ √√ √√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√
CSSC Middle √ √ √ √√ √ √ √√√ √√√ √√√ √ √ √ √√ √ √√ √√ √√
ITN Cell:
TNVS contractors:
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Finance (vide memorandum MSD/003/215/2002 dated 24th
July 2002) and while waiting for an official response, more
consignments are arriving at the sea and airports, demanding
huge payment arising from taxes, port storage and demurrage."
The MSD ended their memorandum by requesting the
Permanent Secretary, MoH to discuss this issue bilaterally
with the Permanent Secretary, MoF, as a matter of
urgency. In a subsequent meeting of the NATNET steering
committee on 25th June 2003, it was observed that, as a
result of pressure by the NMCP through the ITN Cell and
other stakeholders (including private and public), the
MoF endorsed in the 2004 Budget that VAT on mosquito
nets was zero-rated and the customs duty on the yarn was
also removed. This was a remarkable breakthrough in
ensuring that the price of nets remained stable in the
country.
The scenario depicted here reinforces the high administra-
tive and technical resources which the individuals in the
steering committee brought to bear in this particular high
stake issue and its consequences in the public arena. The
Implementation phase – The sources of actors influence over the implementation of an ITN subsidy scheme – 2004 – 2005 Figure 7
Implementation phase – The sources of actors influence over the implementation of an ITN subsidy scheme – 
2004 – 2005. Source of influence figures adapted from; Gilson L., Doherrty J., Lake S., Mcintyre D., Mwikisa C and Thomas 
S.2003. The SAZA study: implementing health financing reform in South Africa and Zambia. Hlth Policy and Planning. 18 (1): 
31–46. Political resource – described here as the influence that the stakeholder has on the ITN subsidy scheme through direct 
or indirect interaction with government officials. Government here is denoted as 'public institutions in which collective deci-
sions are made into laws that affect the whole society; parliament, the executive, the bureaucracy, ministries or departments of 
state (Walt, 1994)'. Technical resource – described here as the inherent technical expertise that the stakeholder has that 
would be critical to the implementation of the policy or by virtue of the stakeholders position in relation to the implementa-
tion of the policy. For example the presence of the Tanzania Net Manufacturers in the country providing a market for mos-
quito nets. Financial resource – the stakeholders influence over the economic situation. For example, Promotional Service 
International conducting social marketing of ITNs in the remotest parts of the country, or DFID availing financial support 
towards social marketing initiatives. Number of ticks indicates relative level of influence derived from source: 3 ticks = high 
influence; no tick = no influence. For example the influence of the Chief Medical Officer derived from technical source was due 
to his authoritative position as the lead advisor in health within the Ministry of Health and as a Chairperson of the steering 
committee of the Tanzania National Voucher Scheme. While the influence of the Tanzania Net Manufacturers derived from 
technical source is their expertise in the local production of mosquito nets, hence the availability of the public health commod-
ity within the country locally. Values/behaviours refers to the differing behaviours of the actors (e.g. rooted in clear principles 
or values, tactical and strategic, expressing commitment). For example the CSSC was highly committed to PPPs as a general 
health policy and was spearheading it so that it could be institutionalized; however it perceived that the ITN subsidy scheme 
had not adequately involved Faith Based Organizations at the grass root level
Technical Financial
Tanzania Net 
Manufacturers
middle √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√
TANAAM Middle/high √√ √√ √√ √√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√
Promotional 
Service 
International
high √√ √√ √√ √√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√
GFATM - 
Technical 
Review Panel
Middle/high √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√
GFATM - PWC middle √√ √√ √√ √√ √ √ √ √√ √ √ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√ √√ √√ √√
WHO Middle/high √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√
UNICEF high √ √ √ √√ √ √√ √√ √√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √ √ √ √√ √ √√ √√ √√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√
DFID, SDC, DCI, 
RNE Middle/high √√ √√ √√ √√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √ √ √ √√ √ √√ √√ √√ √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√
Research:
IHRDC, LSHTM Low √√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √√ √ √ √ √√ √ √ √
Faith Based Organization:
Red Cross middle √ √ √ √√ √ √ √√ √ √ √√ √ √√ √√ √√
Bilateral:
Source of Influence*
Political 
resource
Economic resource Knowledge of 
PPPs
Values/Behavio
urs
ł
Degree of 
Participation
Actors
Overall 
influence
Private sector for - profit:
Multilateral:
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malaria agenda turned from 'business-as-usual' to a 'crisis'
event. Without these concerted efforts the government
would not have resolved the tax rationalization in a timely
manner, which would have been detrimental to the PPP
approach to scaling up ITNs in the country.
The members of the steering committee were consistently
supporting the ITN subsidy scheme with high influence
over the events that occurred in both the decision making
stage and the pre- implementation phase (Figures 5 and
6) and high support in the decision making process (Fig-
ure 2).
Challenges faced in signing the GFATM award
As the opinion leaders were being groomed such that
there was heightened political commitment towards
malaria control in the country; behind the scenes there
were a number of teething problems in the pre-imple-
mentation phase with regards to the signing of the
GFATM award.
The United Republic of Tanzania (URT), through its
MoH, had been awarded USD 19 million from the
GFATM for the implementation of the TNVS [57]. There
were a number of critical and fundamental organizational
arrangements, which the MoH and other government sec-
tors had to lay down from the period that the GFATM
grant agreement had been signed in 2002 to the launching
of the Tanzania National Voucher Scheme in October
2004. It was also observed that in parallel, the GFATM, in
these very early years of their operations, was also devel-
oping and strengthening its own systems as they delivered
financial support to recipient countries with variable
monetary and administrative mechanisms.
This scenario may have prompted one of the stakeholders
spearheading the TNVS within the ITN cell to remark as
follows:
"...GFATM have not always committed themselves to the devel-
opment process. They call themselves development agencies,
they do not want to hear about the context in which their money
is being spent...they had no understanding or compassion that
there are health systems constraints that one cannot solve
within a 5 year programme (16th January 2006)."
Most stakeholders interviewed in this synthesis noted that
it would be prudent for GFATM grants in the future to
allow a preparatory period within the proposal before the
actual start date for implementation. Hence, the prepara-
tory period would include all administrative issues and
any other unforeseen logistical issues, which the recipient
country would put in place prior to the implementation of
the grant.
Bottleneck one: procurement, tendering procedures and 
structures for implementation
The TNVS was one of the first proposals to be accepted
worldwide by GFATM in the first round for the call of pro-
posals in 2002. In accordance to one stakeholder, "...one
of the first ones around the world and one of the best ones
too...(29th October 2006)." But in spite of this, taking off
and becoming active was another issue.
In the Tanzanian context, the TNVS grant took one year
from 2002–2003 for tendering of contractors who would
be involved in the actual implementation of the pro-
gramme. These included the Mennonite Economic Devel-
opment Agency, the World Vision International, the
Ifakara Health Research and Development Centre and the
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
(LSHTM). The time was also spent in appointing a team
leader for the programme. In 2003, the team leader was
recruited at the beginning of the year and an administra-
tor and a communication officer were recruited at the end
of 2003. The recruitment of the technical staff for the ITN
cell was subjected to the normal procurement procedures
of the MoH through competitive bidding. The process
involved, preparations of the expression of interest
through advertising of the posts, calling for the proposals,
evaluation, awarding and negotiations. Financial support
for the technical staff of the ITN cell was made available
from the Swiss Development Corporation.
Bottleneck two: principles of handling government foreign 
currency
The other bottleneck that was faced by the MoH, after
being awarded the TNVS agreement, included principles
of handling foreign currency by the government as stipu-
lated by the MoF. The MoF referred to an Act of the gov-
ernment, which states that foreign money from donors
availing financial support to the United Republic of Tan-
zania through the public sector should be channelled
through the MoF before being handled by the recipient
ministry concerned. The MoF was the sole custodian of
that fund and would be the one signing the grants on
behalf of the Government of Tanzania rather than the
implementing ministry. This was in spite of the fact that
in the TNVS grant proposal, the Principle Recipient (PR)
was the MoH. In this respect, the PR had been selected by
the Country Coordinating Mechanism in the country to
be legally responsible for programme results and financial
accountability, as stipulated in the GFATM fiduciary
arrangements at the time [58]. These organizational issues
between the two ministries delayed the signing of the
agreement by two weeks from the day it was awarded. A
related financial bottleneck was the issue of the sub-con-
tractors identified to implement the TNVS being required
by government procedures to pay VAT. However, the
GFATM had set a condition in their guidelines for theMalaria Journal 2009, 8:201 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/8/1/201
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application for grants at the time, that the grants that they
would award were not to be used by the recipient country
to pay VAT[59]. One of the stakeholders, who had been
selected independently as the 'Local Fund Agent' of the
GFATM grants in the country was Price Waterhouse Coop-
ers. As the Local Fund Agent, they monitored the imple-
mentation of the activities of the GFATM, including the
contracting negotiations and agreeing on the provisos and
verifying the plans at the initial stages [58]. Price Water-
house Coopers worked tirelessly with the MoF to get a
government notice to be signed by the MoF, which was
subsequently placed in the government gazette, to relieve
the recipients of the GFATM award on the payment of
VAT.
The Local Fund Agent is only a medium supporter to the
ITN subsidy scheme in the key steps towards the imple-
mentation of the scheme, as he confronts the complexities
of the procurement hurdles of the Central Tender Board
and MoF bottlenecks (Figure 2). His influence over the
scheme however shifts to 'medium/high' as he puts all his
efforts to ensure that there are solutions to overcome the
problems (Figure 6).
Adding the bottlenecks mentioned above equalled to a
whole year's delay in the implementation of the TNVS
programme. In fact, one of the respondents was quoted as
follows, "The GFATM was close to scrapping the programme.
It took a very senior official from the GFATM to come to Tan-
zania and institute negotiations so that the programme was
given a new life. Basically by saying that the start date is differ-
ent from the actual start date that was originally in the contract
... (29th October 2006).' Furthermore another interviewee,
who was an International Public Health specialist advis-
ing the MoH on health issues, commented, "...by coinci-
dence I was in Tanzania when the Portfolio Manager was in
Tanzania definitely with instructions to stop the project because
of an 11 months delay in issuing contracts. They felt that this
was due to technical incompetence (18th October 2006)."
The GFATM at the international level hailed Tanzania for
being one of the first countries to be awarded a GFATM
grant and were confident that they would not be disap-
pointed in the implementation of the intervention. How-
ever, within nine months of the release of the funds to the
MoH, and no implementation having taken place, they
quickly reverted to being 'opposed,' to the intervention
short of scrapping the grant as observed in Figure 2.
Joint efforts open a window of opportunity in salvaging the 
GFATM grant
A joint memo was written by the Chair, Roll Back Malaria
'Working Group on scaling up ITNs' and the RBM Secre-
tariat Focal Person, East African Regional Network to the
GFATM, in August 2004 requesting for a 'No-cost Exten-
sion of Phase I: Jan 2005 – 31st October 2005 [60]'. This
memo was copied to the Permanent Secretary of the MoH,
the Executive Secretary of RBM Secretariat and WHO.
In part the request is quoted as follows "...Despite the
delays, much has been accomplished that is essential to a rapid
and efficient roll out of the programme. In the 18 months since
January 2003, there have been dramatic increases in domestic
commercial market distribution and sales of both bundled and
treatment kits (2.3 million ITNs) and separate Insecticide Re-
treatment Kits (2.6 million kits) for existing nets even without
the voucher due to strong demand creation supported by the
NATNETs programme and the low cost of nets on the domestic
market. The voucher will now come at the best time to add
greater rural penetration and equity of access to the rapidly
growing culture of ITNs...The preparatory stage also included a
pilot voucher distribution in two districts to be completed and
lessons incorporated into the first design of roll out.... Counter-
feit resistant vouchers have been designed, produced and pro-
cured...detailed work plans for a staggered nation wide launch
schedule have been developed... [60]."
The memorandum also stressed that there was no blue
print elsewhere for a country-wide discount voucher
scheme, earmarked for the control of malaria. Secondly, it
used a novel approach of bringing together and building
two existing systems: the public sector arm, where the
pregnant women were receiving the discount vouchers,
and the private sector distribution of the commodity, in a
new configuration in order to achieve high coverage, effi-
ciency, equity and sustainability of ITN use by the most
vulnerable group.
One interviewee remarked as follows in relation to the
uniqueness of the scheme, "This is not only the first voucher
project done in Tanzania. It is the first nation-wide voucher
programme addressing health that has ever been done in Africa
(2nd February 2006)."
The memorandum also noted that changes in public sys-
tems and strengthening take both time and careful prepa-
ration to get right. However once accomplished provide a
solid foundation for rapid and sustained progress [60].
The GFATM endorsed this request and subsequently the
NATNET project lost almost 2.5 million USD due to the
delay.
In relation to the reaction of the GFATM to the delays that
Tanzania experienced, one stakeholder had the following
point of view...."the GFATM as a funding agent, for them it
was expedient to fund projects that bought nets hence less logis-
tics as all the money would be spent in the first week. As opposed
to a systems approach which was intended to spend money con-
tinuously over time....they would prefer campaign type ofMalaria Journal 2009, 8:201 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/8/1/201
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approaches rather than system strengthening approaches (18th
October 2006)."
Joint efforts between national and international stake-
holders opened a window of opportunity in salvaging the
GFATM award for the implementation of the TNVS.
Contractors of the Tanzania National Voucher scheme 
and the challenges they faced
The three major contractors in the implementation of the
TNVS had their own experience and challenges as they
were learning-by-doing in this massive scale-up exercise of
ITNs in the country. In order to have a sense of how the
early days of implementation faired and their own experi-
ences they were included in the stakeholders analysis.
The logistic contractor was MEDA, responsible for all the
logistic arrangements for the production of vouchers,
identifying the retailers and wholesalers and reimburse-
ment of the manufacturers of the mosquito nets. The
Director of MEDA at the time described their responsibil-
ities as the logistic contractor in the following manner
"....designing and printing of vouchers, ensuring vouchers get
to the District Medical Officer and then to the Reproductive
and Child Health clinics, identifying and signing up the retail-
ers and wholesalers and the net manufacturers through out the
country....We are involved in every step of the movement of the
voucher including the final step which is the payment to the
wholesalers and the manufacturers (2nd February 2006)."
Regional managers from MEDA were placed in each
region. They approached the district on the implementa-
tion of the TNVS through the District Medical Officer
(DMO). World Vision International and Care Interna-
tional were appointed as the training and promotion con-
tractors. Their responsibilities included designing
promotional materials for TNVS. Apart from training the
Council Health Management Teams and the RCH staff,
they also included the District Planning Officer, the Dis-
trict Executive Director and the District Cultural Officer of
the respective district. Ifakara Health and Research Devel-
opment Centre and the LSHTM were the monitoring and
evaluation contractors for TNVS. The institutions were
independent in their monitoring with a schedule that
included different types of surveys. These were household
and health facility surveys, qualitative studies through in-
depth interviews, tracking of vouchers and retail auditing.
The baseline for the household survey was carried out in
July-August 2005 and it has been repeated yearly thereaf-
ter [22].
The Director of MEDA expressed the fears that he had
prior to the implementation of the TNVS programme,
especially bearing in mind there was no blue print to fol-
low. He was quoted as follows '....fear of the voucher being
produced as forgery, how the clinic staff would react to addi-
tional responsibility, how would the retailers and wholesalers
perceive vouchers?.........some of the wholesalers said that if it
is the government we do not want to be involved. An NGO we
can be involved (2nd February 2006).'
When probed as to why the private sector was weary of
working with the government, the Director explained
"....There is a lot of suspicion in the private sector about the gov-
ernment and actually vice versa because one of the things that
you struggle with is that many people in the government and
Non-Governmental Organizations see business as evil. It is very
difficult to see them as potential partners......... The reality is
this project does not work without the public sector support at
all or the private sector support at all and really the private sec-
tor has reacted even better than we thought they would. You
have manufacturing companies which have purchased 5 or 6
trucks, because the distribution is so much more developed (2nd
February 2006)."
Another challenge observed was the underestimation of
the vastness and geographical complexity of Tanzania.
The topography in some districts really challenged them
where districts had health facilities built in complex infra-
structure. The Manager of the Logistics Component in
MEDA also mentioned the problem of existing revolving
fund projects within some of the health facilities in the
country. The MOH had taken action on this issue by writ-
ing a memorandum to all DMO's informing them that
given the nature of the voucher scheme, it was deemed
essential that existing ITN activities do not contradict or
hinder the principle of PPPs, which the TNVS was
embarking upon. The regions were requested to examine
ways in which existing ITN activities (such as revolving
funds, sale of nets by health facilities, and free distribution
of ITNs) could be phased out once the TNVS was intro-
duced in the respective districts. Furthermore the districts
could explore means of integrating the discount voucher
scheme so as not to create two parallel systems, which
would be difficult to implement.
The training and promotion contractor alluded to the
timelines for the implementation of the TNVS. He noted
that the period of covering the whole country with the
scheme was too short. He took into cognizance the year
that was spent on administrative and logistic issues, after
the signing of the grant in 2002 up to the actual launch in
2004 as already mentioned. The contractor felt that the
work was very intensive. It was also noted by this contrac-
tor that some retailers, which had been selected in respec-
tive districts to sell ITNs to the pregnant women, had a
tendency to inflate the prices of the mosquito nets. Hence,
this became a barrier to the pregnant woman accessing the
mosquito net against the intended policy of the interven-
tion.Malaria Journal 2009, 8:201 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/8/1/201
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The monitoring and evaluation contractor noted several
challenges in two surveys, which had been conducted at
the time of this synthesis. In a qualitative study conducted
in 2006 in four districts by the monitoring and evaluation
contractor, the nurses expressed that there was work over-
load since the setting in of the voucher scheme. It was also
apparent that there was a period where the districts expe-
rienced voucher stock outs, which were related to admin-
istrative arrangements of replenishment by the CHMTs.
As noted by the other contractors, the RCH staff some-
times became a barrier to women as they demanded a
proof of 'top-up.' Another problem observed was that the
vouchers were not reaching the remotest part of the dis-
tricts, as they were not carried by health workers who went
to outreach and mobile services within respective districts.
The contractor also noted that some of the women inter-
viewed were not aware of the 'face-value' of the voucher.
They equated the voucher entitling them to a cheap net
and did not perceive that they had to pay a 'top-up.' The
coordinator of the monitoring and evaluation component
of TNVS expressed that the experience the IHRDC had on
social marketing of ITNs in Kilombero-Ulanga project in
2000–2002 was very useful in the large scale country wide
discount voucher scheme [19].
The subsidy scheme is challenged with a directive from the 
Head of State
Another challenge that faced the subsidy scheme was a
directive from the head of state of the URT related to free
delivery of mosquito nets in the country. The World Eco-
nomic Forum, a not-for-profit organization which holds
annual meetings on various topics, held its summit in
Davos, Switzerland with the theme 'Taking Responsibility
for Tough Choices [61]'. One of the agendas put forward
at the meeting was debt relief for Africa. Professor Jeffrey
Sachs, Director of the Earth Institute at the University of
Columbia and Director of the United Nation Millennium
Project, mentioned at the meeting that debt relief was the
only hope for economic development in Africa. He called
for the cancellation of multilateral debt to the most
impoverished nations in Africa.
The honourable President of the United Republic of Tan-
zania, Benjamin William Mkapa was at the time one of
the Commissioners of the Commission of Africa at the
WEF. In response to Dr Sachs remarks, he made the fol-
lowing statement, " Each year I must find several million dol-
lars to service the Tanzanian debt. I can use that money for bed
nets, which would prevent the loss of 1 million lives every year
to malaria."
In response to the honourable President's plea, a famous
actress – Sharon Stone – pledged USD 10,000 to buy bed
nets for Africa. She wanted to raise 1 million USD, which
would go directly to the GFATM to buy mosquito nets to
stop deaths from malaria in the developing world [61].
In March 2005, the Tanzania National Coordinating
Mechanism [62] of the GFTAM met to negotiate on the
best use of the 'Sharon Stone' funds (Alex Mwita, personal
communication). After a lot of debate and in spite of the
MoH's position in relation to the delivery of mosquito
nets through PPPs, it was agreed that LLINs would be
bought and delivered free-of-charge with the measles,
Vitamin A and de-worming campaign, which was to take
place country-wide in July 2005. The target regions were
Lindi and Mtwara as they had the highest infant mortality
(129 and 126 per 1,000 live births, respectively in Lindi
and Mtwara) and the highest under five mortality in the
country (217 and 212 per 1,000 lives birth, respectively in
Lindi and Mtwara), compared to a national average 99 per
1,000 live births for infant mortality and an under five
mortality of 112 per 1,000 live births [63].
However, by May 2005 only 20% of the pledge from the
World Economic Forum had come through to Tanzania.
The MoH had ordered LLINs in advance through the A-to-
Z Textile factory, but had to cancel. UNICEF intervened to
save the situation by agreeing to bridge the gap. UNICEF
readily accepted to take this position as part of their coop-
erate agenda in protecting vulnerable groups in malaria-
endemic areas in Africa through accelerated deployment
of ITNs [64].
Conventional nets bundled with insecticide re-treatment
kits were ordered from the same textile company and dis-
tributed to Lindi in July/August 2005 and Mtwara in
December 2005 in the country-wide immunization cam-
paign. A MoH official responded as follows about the free
net distribution campaign "The private sector thought that
we are killing the net market in those regions, we are working
against the public-private partnerships. But we allayed their
fears in that this was a one-off activity not continuous. An offer,
a Presidential initiative which we could not go against, the
market for nets is not limited to under fives only. The popula-
tion of under-fives is 20%. 80% of the people still need the nets
(3rd February 2006)". One of the net manufacturers went as
far as writing a memorandum to the Roll Back Malaria
Secretariat in Geneva related to the intention of the coun-
try intending to distribute ITNs freely to vulnerable
groups against the standing agreement that Tanzania had
in delivering ITNs through a PPP mechanism (memoran-
dum dated 15th June 2005). In response, the RBM Director
stressed that the government had through consultations
embarked on the campaign as a one-off presidential cam-
paign consequent to the precedents set at the Davos meet-
ing in January 2005. Secondly, that the campaign had not
changed the policy of the MoH with regards to the PPP
approach in delivering ITNs. Thirdly, she stressed that the
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) results (2004/
2005) were evidence that the country had increased ITN
coverage in both vulnerable groups compared to the
2000–2001 data. Finally, she alluded to some of the indi-Malaria Journal 2009, 8:201 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/8/1/201
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cators which were being observed from the launched dis-
count voucher scheme, including high redemption rates
by pregnant women up to 85% at the time, early attend-
ance of pregnant women to antenatal clinics and an
expanding domestic commercial market of bundled mos-
quito nets through strong demand creation pump-primed
by social marketing. An administrator from the ITN cell
had the following to say in relation to free ITN distribu-
tion "It was a fact that this letter the private sector wrote went
to the Presidential level. The minister had to call us and the
Programme manager, myself and the Permanent Secretary. We
had to narrate how we reached this consensus, showing all the
correspondence....... (24th January 2006)."
In a meeting held by the NMCP to discuss the possibility
of developing an equity voucher to address the 15% of
pregnant women who were not redeeming their vouchers
for a net, the MoH decided to clarify the issues surround-
ing free net delivery of mosquito nets in two regions in the
country in 2005. The programme manager for malaria
read a statement of the Ministry of Health and Social Wel-
fare with regard to ITNs on behalf of the Director of Pre-
ventive Services in the MoH [65]. "In summary, the MoH
reiterated that the free net distribution in Lindi and
Mtwara was an exceptional activity arising from the pecu-
liar circumstances and in no way represented a policy shift
within government. The statement also stressed that equi-
table protection of the most physiologically vulnerable
groups will be encouraged through the consideration and
development of targeted subsidies designed to encourage
commercial sector participation in ITN distribution. Sub-
sidies will be linked to utilization of other essential health
intervention packages, such as antenatal and Expanded
Programme for Immunization (EPI) services [65]."
Challenges of the TNVS at the community level
A retrospective cohort of women of child-bearing age
from Ikwiriri and Kibiti divisions of the Rufiji district,
Coast region, under the Rufiji DSS database were followed
up twice in the survey coinciding with the normal demo-
graphic surveillance updates. The survey enabled the ana-
lyst to collect information on the knowledge of the
women on the TNVS, access to ITNs, barriers to access and
redemption mechanisms. The manner in which the
women solved the challenges they faced in acquiring mos-
quito nets was also documented.
The cohort of women of child-bearing was matched with
the socio-economic status of the households from the
Rufiji DSS in 2000. From the 1,048 women who were
being followed up, 698 matched in the first survey (Feb-
ruary to May 2005) and 678 women matched in the sec-
ond survey (June to September 2005). It was observed
that the number of women in the two surveys did not
match due to the specific questions that the survey was
asking, including the acquisition of vouchers from the
Antenatal Clinic by pregnant women for purchasing a
mosquito net, and the observation that there could have
been some migration of households from the study site
within the five years difference between the two surveys.
Overall use of mosquito nets in the house holds
The first follow-up of the cohort of women of child-bear-
ing age (referred to as 'study population' hereafter) was
during the February to May 2005 survey, which serves as
the baseline where the voucher was launched in Rufiji dis-
trict. The actual date of the launch of the voucher scheme
was February 2005. The overall net ownership at house-
hold level was 41.8% (292/698) at baseline. In the follow-
up survey after the voucher had been in place for eight
months, the household coverage was 56.05% (380/678)
as shown in Table 3. These results were significant with a
higher proportion of households owning mosquito nets
in the second cross-sectional survey compared to the first
one (p < 0.001).
Proportion of households per wealth quintile in the study 
population
The study population was equally distributed in the
wealth quintiles in both surveys as shown in Table 4,
before matching the study population with ownership of
mosquito nets. Figure 8 shows the frequency of house-
holds per wealth quintiles in the study population of both
surveys.
Table 5 shows the ownership of mosquito nets (treated or
untreated) by wealth quintiles for the first and second sur-
veys of the study population. There is a significant
increase in mosquito net ownership in the most-poor
quintile, followed by the second quintile. However, there
is no significant increase for mosquito net ownership in
the least poor quintile and quintiles 3 and 4. The equity
ratio was significant in the second survey (0.48) com-
pared to the first survey (0.21). When the ownership for
mosquito nets is disaggregated by wealth quintiles, it is
observed that the first and second quintiles have a higher
proportion of mosquito nets. The reasons could be that
they have had access to the many opportunities around
them to get mosquito nets, including the pregnant
women voucher and free nets distributed through some
missionary hospitals at the time of survey. It is most likely
that the least poor did not take the opportunity to acquire
more nets, as they already possessed nets in their house-
holds. The equity ratio confirms these findings, together
with Figure 9, which shows ownership of mosquito nets
by wealth quintiles for the study population in the first
survey (February to May 2005) and Figure 10, which
shows ownership of mosquito nets by wealth quintiles for
the study population in the second survey (June to Sep-
tember 2005).Malaria Journal 2009, 8:201 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/8/1/201
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Households with mosquito nets obtained through the 
voucher scheme
In the baseline survey between February and May 2005
the number of pregnant women who received their mos-
quito nets through the voucher scheme were 79.44%
(228/287), while eight months into the voucher scheme
71.17% (274/385) pregnant women received their nets
through this mechanism (Table 6). There was a signifi-
cantly lower number of pregnant women acquiring their
mosquito nets through the voucher scheme in the second
cycle. The reason may be due to other sources of mosquito
nets, which were available at the time of the survey
through the missionary hospitals. The missionary hospi-
tal at Mchukwi and some missionary health centres were
giving out free mosquito nets to pregnant women who
came to deliver at the hospital. This was done to encour-
age the women to deliver at health facilities rather than at
home. The missionary hospitals had been doing this since
2004 (Matron Mchukwi hospital, personal communica-
tion). Furthermore free nets were also distributed in July
2005 in a national campaign for measles.
Acquisition of mosquito nets through the Tanzania 
National Voucher scheme by study population by wealth 
quintile
Figure 11 shows the proportion of the study population
with mosquito nets obtained through the voucher pro-
gramme against their social economic status. In both sur-
veys, the least poor were most likely to purchase a
mosquito net through the voucher scheme, at 38% and
34%, respectively. There was no significant difference
between the two surveys for the most poor who remained
with very low acquisition of mosquito nets in both sur-
veys, at 6.7% and 7.3%, respectively. These results are the
reverse of what was observed in the general pattern of
household possession of mosquito nets in Table 3. The
general pattern in the households was that in the second
survey there was a significant difference in the acquisition
of mosquito nets in this group compared to the first sur-
vey. The reason for the difference observed in acquisition
of mosquito nets through the voucher scheme is that in
spite of the two surveys not differing in overall net acqui-
sition through the voucher scheme the equity ratio is also
very low at 0.21 in the second survey compared to 0.17 in
the first survey confirming there had been no improve-
ment of getting nets through this method. The data may
be too small to detect this difference at this very early stage
of voucher scheme implementation at the Rufiji DSS, but
it is also possible that the information about the scheme
had not reached a greater proportion of the households at
the time.
Results of focus group discussions
Two Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were conducted
during the course of the survey. The first one was carried
out in Ikwiriri Division at Tanga-mbili sub-village (Figure
1). This included 10 women of child-bearing age: with an
age range of 18 to 30 years and an average of 25.4 years.
Fifty percent of these women were pregnant at the time of
the survey and the remaining had infants. The second
FGD was carried out in Kibiti Division at Kibiti Central
sub-village (Figure 1). Twelve women of child-bearing age
were involved, with an age range of 17 to 45 years and an
average of 27 years.
Sixty-eight percent of the women had received no formal
education. Five percent had dropped out of school before
completing their formal primary education. Only 28%
had completed their primary education. Sixty-four per-
cent of the women were small-scale farmers in rice pad-
dies, 27% were housewives, and 9% engaged in small
business such as selling fish and tailoring.
Malaria was identified as the major public health problem
followed by diarrhoeal diseases and lastly HIV/AIDS, by a
majority of the women. All the women affirmed that mos-
quito nets were readily available from the shops, shifting
markets and vendors. They quoted that the price range
depended on the size of the net: 3,500 Tshs – 4,000Tshs
(about 3.5 – 4.00 USD at the time of the survey). They
Table 3: Overall ownership of mosquito nets (%) in the 
households in the 1st and 2nd survey of the study population in 
Rufiji DSS
Use of Net Feb -May 05 June – Sept 05 Total
Yes 292 (41.83) 380 (56.05) 672
No 406 (58.17) 298 (43.95) 704
Total 698 (100) 678 (100) 1,376
P value is < 0.001 and CI (-19.45, -08.99)
Table 4: Proportion (%) of households per wealth quintiles for 
the 1st (February – May 2005) and 2nd survey (June – September 
2005) in the Rufiji DSS
Quintile February – May 2005 June – September 2005
1(Poorest) 149 21.35 144 21.24
2 132 18.91 130 19.17
3 138 19.77 134 19.76
4 131 18.77 139 20.50
5 (Least poor) 148 21.20 131 19.32
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affirmed that the nets were bundled with an insecticide re-
treatment kit. On the question of knowledge of the dis-
count voucher scheme, one or two members of the groups
described the scheme and others confirmed. Only two
women in both FGDs were able to give the correct value
of the voucher. The responses ranged from 350 Tshs –
2,250 Tshs. It was evident, due to the low literacy level of
the women, that they did not actually comprehend what
the face value of the voucher was. On the other hand it
also reflects the level of sensitization that they had
received from the RCH Coordinators when they attended
their antenatal clinic and were first introduced to the
scheme.
In addition to receiving vouchers from the public health
facilities and the mission hospital, four mothers men-
tioned that they had received free mosquito nets from one
of the mission health centres. However, 50% of the
women said that they had received free mosquito nets
during the measles campaign held in July 2005. In this
campaign, all children under five received free nets and all
of them were bundled with insecticide re-treatment kits.
With regards to the problems surrounding the operation-
alization of the voucher scheme at the household level,
two issues were described by the FGDs. One respondent
mentioned that the RCH coordinators themselves were
not conversant enough with the system hence they caused
some one to leave the ANC without receiving a voucher.
Even when some pregnant women deliver in the same
clinic that they have been attending antenatal check-ups,
they still did not get their voucher. Another woman actu-
ally confirmed that she had attended antenatal clinic at
least twice in her pregnancy and up until the time she had
delivered, she was never given a voucher. The second
problem cited was the hiking of prices of mosquito nets
by some of the shop-keepers since the discount voucher
scheme began. Thus, the shop-keepers were actually ben-
efiting from the discount voucher by over-pricing the
mosquito nets compared to the price before the scheme
began.
Interviews were also conducted with RCH Coordinators
from three health centres and one hospital, which were
randomly selected within the Rufiji DSS. The health facil-
ities were the Ikwiriri Mission, (a dispensary), the Kibiti
Health Centre (a public facility), Mariamu Consolota dis-
pensary (a mission dispensary) and Mchukwi Hospital (a
missionary hospital) (Figure 1).
The interviewees confirmed that the voucher scheme
begun on the 14th February 2005 in two facilities and on
the 15th February 2005 in the others. They received train-
ing for one day on issues related to malaria and the dis-
count voucher scheme. The trainees were from World
Vision International and the District Nursing Officer (she
is the Integrated Management and Childhood Illness
(IMCI)/Malaria focal point in the district). The RCH coor-
Number of households per socio-economic status for the 1st  (February – May 2005) and 2nd survey (June – September  2005) in the Rufiji DSS Figure 8
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Table 5: Ownership of mosquito nets by wealth quintiles for the 1st survey (February – May 2005) and 2nd survey (June – September 
2005) of the study population in Rufiji DSS
Yes No
Quintile survey % survey % survey % survey %
1 24 8.22 53 13.95 125 30.79 91 30.54
2 30 10.27 60 15.79 102 25.12 70 23.49
3 62 21.23 76 20.00 76 18.72 58 19.46
4 62 21.23 76 20.00 76 18.72 58 19.46
5 114 39.04 110 28.95 34 8.37 21 7.05
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dinators pointed to three major problems which they had
observed since the scheme begun: 1) voucher books could
be depleted before they were replenished by the district,
2) there were women who could not afford the top up to
the voucher and, hence, did not redeem the voucher for a
mosquito net, and 3) there were women who actually
move into the paddy farms during the farming season and
slept in fragile houses and usually these families were
extremely poor. There was a very small probability of
these women accessing the voucher let alone redeeming it.
Analytical features of the challenges faced in the 
implementation of the TNVS
The Abuja declaration clearly stipulated that countries
endemic for malaria were obliged to ensure that there was
a reduction of taxes and tariffs for all mosquito net prod-
ucts so that they became affordable to the communities
[66]. To meet this challenge, early in 1998, the MoH held
a meeting with other relevant government sectors, multi-
laterals, bilaterals, the private sector for – profit and non-
profit to set-up strategies to tackle the issue of taxes and
tariffs on mosquito net products in Tanzania. The strate-
gies included lobbying members of parliament and influ-
ential individuals, wide dissemination of the outcome of
the meeting to international organizations and the media.
The results were fruitful and taxes and tariffs on mosquito
net products including insecticides used to treat the nets
were reduced. His Excellency Benjamin William Mkapa at
a fund raising dinner held in 2000, toward the 'Compre-
hensive malaria control project in Zanzibar' had this to
say on the issue of taxes "...Tanzania was the first country to
take action on the so-called "malaria taxes" last year, by reduc-
ing the total taxes on mosquito nets and insecticides to fight
malaria to a combined rate of 5% only. This has made mos-
quito nets affordable to the people... [67]". Many countries at
the time had not rationalized their taxes and tariffs on
mosquito net products. To date only 15 of the 39 Abuja
signatories of the malaria declaration in 2000 have
reduced taxes and tariffs on this life-saving intervention
[68].
The MoH was strategic in their approach to the tax ration-
alization agenda in (1) allowing a broad discussion
around the tax reform required through a multisectoral
meeting, (2) lobbying key national individuals and organ-
izations, (3) strengthening alliances with relevant interna-
tional organizations such as the World Trade
Organization, WHO and the World Bank, and (4) making
use of the media to bring the issue to the forefront in the
eyes of the public. Most importantly the process was
owned and led by the government itself. Ironically, the sit-
uation lasted only for two years: while the MoH was strug-
gling to ensure how best the mosquito nets could now be
delivered to the communities, the MoF re-introduced
taxes and tariffs on mosquito net products in the country.
The reason behind this is the generation of internal reve-
nue through raising the tax base of some commodities
[69]. The synthesis could not explicitly identify whether
the government officials from the MoF which were
involved in the re-introduction of the taxes were different
from those that reduced the taxes in 1999/2000; what is
evident is that an overarching agenda of raising the
domestic revenue of the country is overshadowing the
efforts of the MoH in the control of malaria. All civil serv-
ants are governed in terms of their loyalties, values and
expertise and avidly follow through their agenda in many
instances. The MOF officials in this context have disre-
garded the history of the removal of taxes on mosquito
net products in the first place having had no consultations
with other relevant sectors on the subject, where they
would have gleaned the repercussion of their decision on
health [54].
Evidently, the rationalization of taxes and tariffs by the
MOH under the particular clause that affected the mos-
quito nets also had an effect on the MSD, who independ-
ently struggled with the new tax bill. Subsequently,
lobbying was carried out by the NMCP and key stakehold-
ers and, in 2004, within the new fiscal budget of the gov-
ernment taxes and tariffs on mosquito net nets and related
products were reduced again. The MoH, through its steer-
ing committee for NATNETS, was able to create an appro-
priate space to manoeuvre, in a complex policy issue and
engaged other actors on the scene in a timely manner to
further the malaria control agenda.
Tanzania was one of the first countries to receive a GFATM
award for malaria control. Nonetheless, it took the coun-
try almost one year from the signing of the grant to the
implementation of the discount voucher activities. The
hurdles faced by the MoH during this period was partly
Ownership of mosquito nets by wealth quintiles for the study  population in the 1st survey (February – May 2005) Figure 9
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due to the procurement bottlenecks within the Central
Tender Board, but was also related to the organizational
arrangements of the GFATM at the time: (1) the GFATM
was a newly-formed funding organization for the three
diseases. It was challenged with an urgent need to show
results in the recipient countries and balance this with the
latter managing the new financing mechanism [70], (2) at
the international level it had high staff turnover with dif-
ferent portfolio managers assigned to countries within
less than a year hence reducing the institutional capacity
of these managers to follow-up on the design and scope of
the proposals, (3) GFATM needed to be sensitive to the
contextual and systemic issues surrounding recipient
countries in as much as they demanded performance
based management [71], and (4) the organization had to
make provision for recipient countries to build health sys-
tems through the grants they disbursed which are critical
for successful programmatic implementation. These
include strengthening the human resource capacity, con-
tracting and procurement procedures, concrete monitor-
ing and evaluation plans etc. One of the major challenges
alluded to by the WHO in reaching the Millennium
Development Goals is failing or inadequate health sys-
tems. Without building and strengthening these systems it
will be difficult to reach communities with the desired
health outcomes on time, reliably and in sufficient quan-
tities [72]. It is encouraging that the GFATM has since
2005 incorporated health systems strengthening issues
within country proposals [73].
The international community through the RBM working
group on scaling up ITNs made a historical and timely
intervention to salvage the discount voucher programme
when it was threatened to be 'scrapped' by the Board of
the GFATM in 2004. Their sensitivity to the public health
systems in the country enabled them to articulate the
nature of the unique approach that Tanzania had
embarked upon in the delivery of ITNs through a PPP to
the GFATM and request for a no-cost extension so that the
programme could continue.
In 2005, a year into the implementation of the TNVS and
at a time when the NMCP had covered 75% of the country
with the scheme; a presidential initiative brought uncer-
tainty to the status quo of the PPP initiative amongst
stakeholders. Indeed, the fact that His Excellency the Pres-
ident of the United Republic of Tanzania recognized
malaria as one of his priority agenda's is apparent when
he made a plea at the World Economic Forum to channel
the savings from debt relief towards the purchase of mos-
quito nets [61]. The problem was the consultative or non-
consultative process that the country pursued in the deliv-
ery of the mosquito nets purchased through these funds
[74].
A series of instructions were received by the NMCP from
the GFATM (who were given the task of managing the
funds), in relation to the presidential initiative. The
GFATM desired the funds to be used for quick wins, high
visibility and high profile. The Executive Director of
GFATM at the time suggested saturating an area of high
malaria transmission with at least one LLIN per family to
demonstrate a big measurable impact [74]. But the coun-
try took a different approach. The NMCP was engaged in
rapid planning for the funds with the Tanzania National
Coordinating Mechanism, who in turn were receiving
pressure from the President's office, the Prime Minister's
office and the MoH to finalize the proposal for the initia-
tive. Finally a decision was made to deliver free LLINs to
two regions with the highest poverty rates and infant mor-
tality.
Notably, the Presidential initiative had turned the malaria
agenda into a crisis event. The stakes were high, there was
high visibility and there was a lot of uneasiness not only
for the domestic net manufacturers who had invested
heavily in the production of mosquito nets but amidst the
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Table 6: Proportion (%) of households with mosquito nets 
obtained through the voucher program from the study 
population
Voucher February – May June – September Total
2005 2005
Yes 228 79.44 274 71.17 502
No 59 20.56 111 28.83 170
Total 287 385 672
P value = 0.0074 with 95% CI (1.76, 14.78)Malaria Journal 2009, 8:201 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/8/1/201
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members of the NATNETs steering committee as well. The
institutions the steering committee members belonged to
had availed considerable grants towards the PPP approach
in the delivery of nets in the country. One member of the
steering committee was quoted as follows '...we have been
mandated by the Ministry of Health to advise the government
on matters related to scaling up of ITNs in Tanzania, but in this
Presidential initiative, we have been left out...'. Members of
the steering committee, who were mostly from the bilat-
eral organizations such as the UK Department for Interna-
tional Development, the Swiss Development
Cooperation, the Development Cooperation for Ireland
and the Royal Netherlands Embassy became moderate/
poor supporters of the programme in this phase of the
implementation of the scheme (Figure 3) and had low
influence on the events around them (Figure 6).
As for the net manufacturers, they were really desperate
and wrote a memorandum straight to the RBM Secretariat
in Geneva reiterating their fears with regards to the agree-
ments that the manufacturers had been enforced with the
government on the PPP approach (Figures 3 and 6). The
RBM Secretariat responded by carefully outlining that this
was a 'one-off' event and the country would not abandon
its core strategy in the delivery of mosquito nets.
In the few months that the grant for implementing the
President's initiative was being handled by the NMCP,
constraints were also observed between the NMCP and
UNICEF. In spite of the fact that this multilateral organi-
zation had bridged the gap in a very timely manner when
the grant funds from the World Economic Forum were
delayed, they strongly urged the NMCP to make provision
towards the delivery of free nets (Figure 3). However, the
MoH was reluctant to change their ITN policy due to a
one-off initiative of free delivery of nets in two regions. A
number of issues are drawn out through the free delivery
of nets in this Presidential initiative: (1) implementation
of the policy was in the hands of many different groups
and mostly influential figures in the government includ-
ing the Head of State, (2) there was conflict as the delivery
mechanism of nets in the country is changed, (3) the out-
come of the conflict was being felt in the public arena, (4)
the malaria agenda was turned into a macro-political issue
characterized with high stakes, high visibility, in which
the government takes complete control in driving the
agenda with little or no consultation with other stake-
holders, (5) the timing of the initiative was crucial as the
funds had to be spent quickly and make a visible impact.
Once all the plans were in place and implementation was
underway, the MoH stepped back and called upon its
malaria stakeholders to expound the fact that the free net
delivery carried out in Lindi was a one-off Presidential ini-
tiative, which was beyond their control. They also assured
their partners that the mainstay of the Ministry's delivery
mechanism was the PPP initiative approach.
The challenges observed by the contractors who were
operating the scheme allude to the fact that once policy is
formulated, implementation can take on a different angle
from the initial goal depending on the bureaucrats at the
grass root level [75]. This was reinforced by the focus
group discussions where only 60% of the women who
were eligible to receive their vouchers actually acquired it.
They also underestimated the magnitude of the work and
the difficult terrain that features in some districts in the
country.
The poverty index in the cohort of women of child-bear-
ing age, which were followed up in the two cycles of the
cross-sectional survey, reveal that the most poor are still
disadvantaged in redeeming their vouchers for a net. In
the monitoring and evaluation household surveys con-
ducted in 2006, it was observed that the least poor women
and those living in early launch districts were more likely
to have reported receipt of pregnancy voucher than the
most poor women and those living in the late launch dis-
tricts.
A cross-sectional survey carried out in Rufiji in 2005, with
a large sample size to observe the contribution of various
delivery mechanisms to net use by socio-economic status,
was very significant [28]. Net coverage was far higher for
the least poor with more than 80% of the better off quin-
tile possessing a net. In the least poor quintile, over half
obtained their nets from the commercial market at full
price (the most popular source of nets for all other socio-
economic groups). Monitoring studies showed that cover-
age of the three intermediate wealth quintiles was rela-
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tively even, coverage of the poorest was consistently and
substantially lower for both voucher subsidized and freely
distributed nets. Notably the study has also shown that
the issue of inequity where subsided mechanisms are used
for delivery of goods also applies to goods delivered free
of charge. The larger cross-sectional survey study in Rufiji
observed that the majority of nets used by infants were
obtained through the national voucher scheme and nets
provided free to the end user during the child vaccination
campaign supported by the Red Cross. Net coverage
achieved amongst young children was 50% and over 30%
of coverage amongst older children [28]. Clearly the mix
of catch-up and keep-up strategies in this very poor rural
setting has substantially increased the coverage of mos-
quito nets in discrete populations of the community in a
very complementary manner. The RBM working group on
scalable malaria vector control (WIN) underscores that
'for targeted distribution – a single mass distribution catch-up
campaign followed up by a continuous delivery system inte-
grated into the ANC and EPI catch-up strategy should rapidly
achieve and sustain control coverage levels in excess of 80%
without the need of further campaigns... [76].'
Conclusion
Tanzania took a bold step in the implementation of a
country-wide voucher scheme for the delivery of ITNs
through a PPP approach to vulnerable groups. The stake-
holders had no 'blue-print' in the venture and had to gain
experience as the scheme evolved. The challenges they
encountered articulated in this synthesis lend invaluable
lessons to malaria endemic countries: (a) the consistency
of the stakeholders with a common vision to their desired
goals is an important strength in overcoming obstacles,
(b) senior politicians will often drive the policy agenda
when the policy in question is a 'crisis event', the stakes
are high and there is high visibility, (c) national stake-
holders in policy making have an advantage in strength-
ening alliances with international organizations, where
the latter can become extremely influential in solving bot-
tlenecks as the need arises, and (d) conflict can be turned
into an opportunity as the Presidential initiative has lent
Tanzania a learning ground in 'catch-up' campaigns,
which had not been carried out at that scale in the coun-
try. The outcome is a hybrid of mechanisms including
catch-up and keep up in the newly developed National
Malaria Control Strategic Plan 2008 – 2013 [77].
The United Republic of Tanzania in congruence with its
PPP policy has invested heavily in the scale-up of LLINs in
the A-to-Z net manufacturing company in Arusha, where
in 2005 it contributed to the building of a new tarmac
road to the plant, including the installation of electricity
and water. This was to the tune of about 2.5 million USD
(Anuj Shah, personal communication). The country has
been consistently positive in the PPP approach to ITNs as
seen from 2000 when His Excellency the President of the
URT, at a fund raising dinner for the comprehensive
malaria control project in Zanzibar had this to say ..."I
must caution however, that all political will to fight malaria
notwithstanding, we can only succeed to meet our goals if there
is active participation and support of all stakeholders [67]."
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